This is a letter from the Cappadocian father, Gregory of Nyssa, in the 4th century to a man named Ablabius. Ablabius was facing a question that Unitarians still argue today, and he reached out to Gregory, the leading authority of the time on the Trinity, about how to answer this question. The question is:
Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdity in describing those who are united in nature, if they are more than one, by the plural number of the name derived from their nature. If, then, in the above case, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak of those who are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, though confessing the Three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of nature between them, we are in some sense at variance with our confession, when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to say there are three Gods?
In other words, if three men are called “three men,” while all sharing one nature (namely: human nature) then why shouldn’t we call the Trinity “three gods” when they all share one nature? Doesn’t it seem that there is some sense in which there actually are 3 Gods, the the underlying question.
Gregory admits that the question seems to force one of two positions. He says:
“For by the force of the question, we are at first sight compelled to accept one or other of two erroneous opinions, and either to say there are three Gods, which is unlawful, or not to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is impious and absurd.”
He goes on to say that we basically should seek to find an answer to the dilemma, but even if we don’t have a solid answer, we should hold to whatever apostolic tradition we have received (which he believes, is the Trinity). He states that the reason we shouldn’t say “three gods” is so that we do not conflate our view with polytheism. He then gives his first answer to the problem:
We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are many men, is a customary abuse of language, and that it would be much the same thing to say they are many human natures… When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, … but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which belongs to him as his own — that, I mean, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature — many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs— but the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term man does not belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it.
So what is he talking about here? Basically, he’s making the argument that when we call “Peter, James, and John” by the term “three men” (the word men being plural), we are actually doing so incorrectly. If “man” refers to the human nature, and each is of the same human nature, we do not have 3 human natures. “Man” is a universal property. Think of how Paul speaks of man in Romans, or the Hebrews writer when quoting the Psalms. “What is man that you are mindful of him?” Or, “through one man, death spread to all men.” All humans are “man.” We all share the same essence of being “man.” We do not share a different essence, or different kind of humanity than Adam. It is Adam’s humanity that is given to us. There is one nature between Adam, and myself. Strictly speaking, one man, not two men.
There’s a difference between an instance of a property and the property itself. So among dogs, we have poodles, huskies, and labs. Yet they all share the one essence of being “a dog.” They are different kinds of dogs, but the nature is common. The nature is one. The poodle is a dog in the exact same way the husky is a dog. While it may be idiomatic to refer to them as “dogs,” and “canines,” there’s only one kind of thing there, namely, dog. In a room full of humans, there’s only one kind of being there. Human.
When we say “there are three humans” we are implying that there are three natures rather than individuals. However, Peter, James, and John, are all one nature. They are all part of human nature. When you see these three, you see one human nature. You do not see a different nature in Peter than you do in John. Thus, it isn’t actually correct to call them three humans. But one, singular, human, when referring to the nature.
However we don’t address people by their nature. If I am in a crowd and I say “human, raise your hand,” every human would raise it. When I say “man” or “human,” I’m referring to the general nature. Not the individual. So if Jesus is “God” by nature, and we call him “God,” we are not referring to the person as a different God than the Father, and we are not referring to the person as “God,” we are just speaking of what they are.
We speak of individuals by that which individuates them. Calling someone by their nature does not individuate them from anyone else in that nature. If I look at Peter, James, and John, I cannot specify any one of them by saying “man,” I’m simply referring to the one shared nature. If we were to call the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, “three gods,” we are assuming they each have a different kind of nature, and each does not have the same nature as each other. This would be to assume the husky is more of a dog than a poodle, and a poodle is a dog in a different way than the Labrador.
Imagine I have a bucket of red paint. I have 3 boards of wood. I paint each wooden board with that same red paint. I couldn’t say that there are three different ways in which each board is red. I couldn’t say that there are “three reds.” I could say that I have three different things that are red. That are each red. In which case, “red” is singular. I do not have “many reds,” I have many “things which are red.” Similarly, we would not have “many gods,” we would have “many things that are God.” Singular.
This is Gregory’s point. If we say that three men are three humanities, we are actually speaking incorrectly. Three individuals, each being human, would not mean multiple humanities. So also, three, each of which are divine in nature, would not make 3 divinities, or 3 gods. Rather, three individuals that are God.
He ends this quote by noting that “Luke is man, Stephen is man, but every man is not Stephen.” This is an old Aristotelian argument. When we denote “Luke” or “Stephen” or “persons” of an essence like humanity, then we necessarily assume some kind of distinction. This is the difference between an individual (or instantiation) and an essence. The difference between “man” and “Luke.” The difference between “the Son” and “God.”
And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more accurate expression, man would be said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality.
Gregory makes several more statements and arguments in this letter. He makes an argument from apophaticism, he makes an argument from energy, and he also makes a pass at the fact that they don’t believe that we count “Gods” by their nature (the Arians were the first to count Gods in this way). I may go into these in detail in later posts, but they are much less common.
Unitarians today use the argument, “If three that are men are three men, can’t we call three that are God three Gods?” Maybe we can “call” it that, but that doesn’t mean this is in fact the case. As we see, this is a breakdown in language as well. This isn’t the way we commonly communicate this idea. We aren’t looking to score debate points. Even if we persuade someone that we can “call” them three gods, it doesn’t follow that there are three Gods. Many Trinitarians count “gods” by their nature. And they argue, “they are one God because they all share one nature.” It is interesting that Gregory never even makes this argument. His argument is, rather, “we shouldn’t even call them three gods because we don’t count things by their nature.” Even if Trinitarians themselves don’t know the answer, we should be more educated than they on their arguments and beliefs. We also need to make honest arguments. The three gods angle in this form isn’t a good argument against them. Especially those who properly understand the Trinity. Little do many Trinitarians know, this has been debated centuries ago. This isn’t a good argument against them. We should strive to be honest when debating them, as we want them to be with us. Also… we really need to do better about reading the early writers.
This argument could be used against Arians. As they do not believe the divine nature of the Father is the same nature as the son, but that the son has “a lesser divine nature.” This is why the “a god” reading of the JWs is pure polytheism. You have the God, and a god, this is two gods. This isn’t the same as counting two men, who share human nature and are therefore “one man,” but this is a man and a dog. Two things. If the second thing is not merely “called” a god, but is to believed to be some kind of God, then we have two gods. Since a trinitarian does not believe the Father is divine in a different way than the Son, you can’t credit them with having a god and another God. If you count by natures, you only have one God.